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Dividend taxation is an important component of investors’
taxes and has attracted the attention of policymakers and
ﬁnancial economists. However, the theory of dividends
and the reform of dividend taxation remain a puzzle. This
paper analyzes the effect of dividend taxation on ﬁrms’ div-
idend policies. Using a natural experiment and difference-
in-difference estimation, we ﬁnd that China’s dividend tax
cut in 2005 led ﬁrms to increase their dividend payments.
Companies with higher proportions of tradable individual
shares or investment fund shares were more likely to
increase their dividend payments. However, opportunistic
behavior also exists, where companies with higher propor-
tions of shares held by executives were also more likely to
increase their dividend payments. These ﬁndings support
the existence of a causal relationship between China’s taxhina Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City
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the reform of dividend taxation in 2005 achieved its goal.
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Dividend taxation is an important component of investors’ taxes and has attracted the
attention of policymakers and ﬁnancial economists. Recently, many countries have begun
to focus on capital market taxation reforms. In China, the State Council promulgated ‘Some
Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of
Capital Markets’ (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Nine Opinions’) in 2004, which stressed
that tax policy in relation to capital markets should be reﬁned to encourage public invest-
ment. On 13 June, 2005, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation
issued the document, ‘Notice on Policies Relating to Individual Income Tax on Dividends
and Bonuses’, which stated that taxes on individual investors’ income from dividends
and bonuses of listed companies should be levied in accordance with the current tax laws
after temporarily deducting 50% of an individual’s taxable income. Therefore, since 13
June, 2005, individual investors’ dividend income has been taxed at a rate of 10%, rather
than 20%. The objectives of the dividend tax cut were to increase the likelihood of compa-
nies making dividend payments, ease the conﬂict of interest between large and minority
shareholders, protect the interests of minority shareholders and encourage public invest-
ment. As a result, this paper examines whether the lower dividend tax rate has led ﬁrms to
increase their dividend payments.
There has been ﬁerce theoretical debate over whether a reduction in the dividend tax
rate would lead ﬁrms to increase their dividend payments. The main dispute is between
the ‘new theory’ or ‘tax capitalization view,’ and the ‘traditional view’ of whether reduc-
tions in dividend tax rates affect the ﬁnancial behavior of companies. Proponents of the
‘traditional view’ stress that if a company mainly relies on external equity ﬁnancing then,
under classical taxation, higher dividend taxation will tend to raise the cost of capital. As
the capital gains tax rates on retained earnings are generally lower than dividend tax rates,
shareholders may beneﬁt from decreased dividend payments. Conversely, a decrease in
dividend tax can limit the ability of ﬁrms to engage in inter-temporal tax arbitrage and
may, therefore, lead companies to increase their dividend payments. The ‘new theory’
developed by King (1977) argues that in cases where companies mainly rely on retained
earnings, mature companies are able to keep all of their proﬁts to meet their equity ﬁnanc-
ing needs and then distribute the remaining proﬁts as dividends, even when there is dou-
ble taxation. Dividend taxes will thus be irrelevant to the companies’ dividend policies. In
this case, a decline in dividend tax may not affect a company’s ﬁnancial behavior and, thus,
its dividend payout.
The results of recent empirical research in this area are not entirely consistent. Chetty
and Emmanuel (2005) analyze the impact of the 2003 dividend tax cut in the United States
on ﬁrms’ payout behavior and ﬁnd that, consistent with the ‘traditional view’, the tax cut
induced companies to increase their dividend payments and created the possibility for an
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et al. (2007), and Blouin et al. (2004). Surveying 384 ﬁnancial executives and conducting
in-depth interviews, Brav et al. (2005) ﬁnd that dividend tax is not a dominant concern
for the majority of ﬁrms and, with respect to the 2003 dividend tax cut, only 28% of ﬁnan-
cial managers felt that it might increase their company’s dividend payout, while the other
70% of ﬁnancial managers believed the decline in dividend tax might not or would not af-
fect their dividend policy. In addition, La Porta et al. (2000) analyze the effects of dividend
taxes around the world, but do not ﬁnd any conclusive results.
Different theories have completely different views on the reform of dividend taxation
policies. Recently, many countries have begun to focus on dividend tax reforms. A number
of developed countries, including the United States, Britain and Germany, have adjusted
their dividend tax rates. However, what is confusing is that the direction of the changes
in dividend taxation has been different. Some countries, such as Britain and Germany, have
increased their dividend tax rates, while others, such as the United States, have reduced
their dividend tax rates. In the United States, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act was enacted in 2003 by President Bush. One of the main provisions of the act was to
reduce the tax on individual dividend income to 15%, instead of the top rate of 35%. How-
ever, the reforms in the United Kingdom and Germany were different. From 1973, share-
holders in the United Kingdom were credited for a portion of the taxes they paid at the
corporate level, through what is known as an imputation-style corporate tax system. How-
ever, in 1997, the amount deductible was reduced from 20% to 10%, thereby effectively
increasing shareholders’ dividend tax rates. This reform brought the UK tax system more
into line with classical taxation. Similarly, Germany’s nearly 30 year old imputation-style
corporate tax system, which was one of the lightest dividend tax systems in the world, was
abolished in 2000, which also led to an increased dividend tax rate.
Therefore, whether declines in dividend tax rates lead ﬁrms to increase their dividend
payments, which then eases the conﬂict of interest between large and small shareholders,
is an important empirical question. However, little large sample empirical research has
been conducted on this important issue in China. In a previous study based on a unique
sample of 86 listed companies releasing A and B shares, Zhang (2007) ﬁnds that, consistent
with the ‘traditional view’, China’s dividend tax cut affected the price of equity capital. Be-
cause the dividend tax rate is higher than the capital income tax rate in China, investors
expect a higher return from companies that make high dividend payments. Although
Zhang’s (2007) research design is ingenious, the study has some deﬁciencies. Leaving aside
the small sample size, there is a systematic difference between the A-share and B-share
markets. In a study of the short-term market reaction to the dividend tax cut, Zeng and
Zhang (2005) ﬁnd that cumulative abnormal returns are positively correlated with divi-
dend payments. They argue that, in China, dividend tax affects asset prices in line with
the ‘traditional view’. However, not all investors were beneﬁciaries of the dividend tax
cut. For example, corporate shares were not subject to the reduced dividend tax rate. Zeng
and Zhang (2005) fail to acknowledge this difference. This paper focuses on the causal
relationship between the dividend tax cut and increased dividend payments, and evalu-
ates the effects of China’s dividend taxation reform.
To examine this causal relationship and evaluate the reform of dividend taxation, this
paper uses a sample of A-share listed companies between 2003 and 2007 for the empirical
tests. In addition, a ‘natural experiment’ and difference-in-difference estimator methods
are used to estimate the impact of the dividend tax cut on companies’ dividend policies.
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Companies with higher proportions of tradable individual shares or investment fund
shares were more likely to increase their dividend payments. However, opportunistic
behavior was also detected, where companies with higher proportions of shares held by
executives were more likely to increase their dividend payments. These ﬁndings support
the existence of a causal relationship between dividend tax cuts and increased dividend
payments and suggest that China’s reform of dividend taxation in 2005 achieved its goal.2. Institutional background and hypotheses
2.1. Institutional background
In China, there is variation in the dividend taxes paid by different investors. Dividend
taxation in China is based on a classical tax system, where the company and the individual
are treated as separate entities and pay separate income taxes. The result is that income is
taxed twice. In the Chinese stock market, only individual shareholders and funds pay div-
idend taxes. According to the Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China,
interest, dividends, bonuses, contingent income and other income are taxed at the rate of
20%. According to the ‘‘Notice on the Tax Policies Relating to Mutual Funds’’ (coded Cai
Shui Zi [2002] No. 128) issued by the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration
of Taxation in 2002, investment funds are required to pay tax on income from dividends,
bond interest and interest on savings at a rate of 20%. However, social security funds are
tax-free. According to Article 26 of the Enterprise Income Tax policy, an enterprise’s fol-
lowing sources of income are tax-free: (a) dividends, bonuses and other equity investment
gains generated between qualiﬁed resident enterprises; and (b) the dividends, bonuses
and other equity investment gains that non-resident enterprises obtain from resident
enterprises, where the non-resident enterprise has organs or establishments inside the
territory of China and has actual connections with such organs or establishments. In these
cases, the dividend income obtained from these enterprises is tax-free.
To promote the healthy and stable development of capital markets, the Nine Opinions
state that the tax policy for capital markets should be reﬁned to encourage public invest-
ment. Since 13 June, 2005, individual dividend income has been taxed at a rate of 10%,
rather than 20%. On 13 June, 2005, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration
of Taxation issued a document coded Cai Shui [2005] No. 102, which stated that the tax
on individual investors’ income from dividends and bonuses of listed companies should
be levied in accordance with current tax laws after temporarily deducting 50% of an indi-
vidual’s taxable income. On the same day, the Ministry of Finance and the State Adminis-
tration of Taxation issued a document coded Cai Shui [2005] No. 107, which stated that the
income that investment funds receive from dividends and bonuses of listed companies
should also be levied after temporarily deducting 50% of taxable income.
2.2. Hypotheses
As the objective of the 2005 tax reform was to encourage public investment, individual
income tax payers received preferential policies. The policymakers were concerned
whether individual shareholders would beneﬁt from the reduction in dividend taxes
and whether it would encourage companies with higher proportions of individual shares
to increase their dividend payments. At the same time, ﬁnancial economists were con-
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their dividend payments and, in the context of China, whether ‘new theory’ is more pow-
erful than the ‘traditional view’. The answers to these basic propositions will provide a the-
oretical basis for the subsequent tax reform in capital markets in China. Therefore, we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Following the reduction in the dividend tax rate, companies with higher
proportions of individual shares increased their dividend payments.
Investment funds have also beneﬁted from the dividend tax cut. Moreover, in recent
years, funds have had an increasingly powerful inﬂuence on companies’ ﬁnancial policies.
Therefore, companies with higher proportions of investment fund shares are more likely to
increase their dividend payments. In addition, the executives of listed companies are indi-
vidual income tax payers and the ﬁnancial policymakers of their companies. Executives
may also increase their companies’ dividend payments for reasons of self-interest. Thus,
we propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2. Following the reduction in the dividend tax rate, companies with higher
proportions of investment fund shares were more likely to increase their dividend
payments.Hypothesis 3. Following the reduction in the dividend tax rate, companies with higher
proportions of shares held by their top executives were more likely to increase their div-
idend payments.3. Research design and sample selection
3.1. Research design
This paper uses the ‘natural experiment’ and difference-in-difference estimator methods
to estimate the impact of the dividend tax cut on companies’ dividend policies. Compared
with similar policies abroad, the tax cut on 13 June, 2005 was very clean,1 because the code
stated there was to be no change in other dividend tax provisions and there was also no
change in other related taxes.2 In general, the tax cut affected companies with shares held
by individuals, investment funds and executives, while companies with corporate holdings
and social security fund holdings were not affected. We use the companies that were subject
to the change in dividend tax as the treatment group, while the companies that were not af-
fected by the dividend tax reform are the control group. We then compare the changes in
companies’ dividend policies before and after the dividend tax cut to estimate the effect of
the tax cut on corporate dividend policies. This methodology uses the exogenous dividend
tax change to estimate the time series and cross-sectional differences in companies’ dividend
policies. As the introduction of the tax cut is an unpredictable event, we assume that listed1 The 2003 tax reform in the United States also included a capital gains tax cut. In addition, the 1986 dividend tax change in
the United States comprised a package of tax reforms.
2 At the same time, the Ministry of Finance and the State Administration of Taxation issued a notice on the Issue Concerning
the Tax Policies Relating to the Pilot Reform of Share-trading, document code Cai Shui [2005] No. 103, which stated that the
individual income tax on stock transfers occurring during the course of the pilot reform of share-trading, where a holder of non-
tradable shares gives consideration to a holder of tradable shares or cash, shall be temporarily exempt. We believe that this did
not affect companies’ normal dividend policies.
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introduction of the policy, there are limited endogenous concerns about changes in the
shareholdings of various groups. The exchange of executives’ shares is subject to numerous
restrictions and securities laws. Moreover, it can have a negative impact on the company. Ex-
change of investment fund shares and individual shares are affected by numerous factors, of
which the reduction in dividend taxes is just one of many. We use the following model to
estimate the impact of the dividend tax cut on companies’ dividend policies.3 Ad
the ac
proﬁts
cash slog itðincreaseitÞ ¼ b0 þ b1taxit þ b2individualit þ b3individualit  taxit
þ b4Nshareit þ b5indeit þ b6ceoit þ b7tobinqit þ b8meetit
þ b9levelit þ b10cashit þ b11sizeit þ b12stateit þ industry ð1Þlog itðincreaseitÞ ¼ b0 þ b1taxit þ b2directorit þ b3directorit  taxit þ b4Nshareit
þ b5indeit þ b6ceoit þ b7tobinqit þ b8meetit þ b9levelit
þ b10cashit þ b11sizeit þ b12stateit þ industry ð2Þlog itðincreaseitÞ ¼ b0 þ b1taxit þ b2fundit þ b3fundit  taxit þ b4Nshareit
þ b5indeit þ b6ceoit þ b7tobinqit þ b8meetit þ b9levelit
þ b10cashit þ b11sizeit þ b12stateit þ industry ð3ÞThe left-hand side variable, increase, is a dummy variable. If the dividend in that year is
greater than in the prior year, the variable increase equals 1 and 0 otherwise. In addition,
we speciﬁcally consider the effect of the regulation issued in May 2001, ‘Administration of
Offerings of New Shares by Listed Companies Procedures’, which focuses on cases where ‘a
company did not distribute any dividends or bonuses during the most recent 3 years and
the board of directors failed to provide a reasonable explanation of the same’. Some com-
panies made trivial dividend payouts to meet this provision. Accordingly, we revise the in-
crease variable. Speciﬁcally, if the dividend payments in this year are more than those in
the previous year, but the pre-tax dividend is less than 0.1 Yuan per share, the increase
equals 0 (the same study design also appears in Deng and Zeng (2005) and Wu et al.
(2003)). Furthermore, a regulation issued in May 2006 stated that, ‘Proﬁts distributed
accumulatively in the latest 3 years in cash or stocks shall be no less than 20% of annual
distributive proﬁts of the latest 3 years’. We also revise the increase variable to capture
the effect of this regulation.3 Speciﬁcally, if the accumulative proﬁts distributed in the latest
3 years in cash or stocks are more than 20% and less than 25% of the annual distributive prof-
its of the latest 3 years, the increase equals 0.
The right-hand side variable, Tax, is also a dummy variable. We deﬁne the event date of
the tax cut as the announcement date of the document coded Cai Shui Zi [2005] No. 102. If
a company’s dividend declaration date is after 13 June, 2005, the variable Tax equals 1 and
0 otherwise. In China, the provisions for dividend payments do not change after theministration of Offerings of New Shares by Listed Companies Procedures Article 8 (e), issued on May 8, 2006, states that
cumulative proﬁts distributed in the last three years in cash or stocks shall be no less than 20% of annual distributive
of the last 3 years. This was also amended on October 9, 2008 to the accumulative proﬁts distributed in the last 3 years in
hall be no less than 30% of annual distributive proﬁts of the last 3 years.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean Std. Minimum Median Maximum
Increase 0.171 0.377 0 0 1
Tax 0.525 0.499 0 1 1
Individual 0.011 0.01 0 0.009 0.078
Fund 0.023 0.051 0 0 0.454
Director 6.187 5.66 0 8.623 19.291
Nshare 0.57 0.131 0 0.593 0.826
Inde 0.342 0.052 0 0.333 0.75
Ceo 0.113 0.316 0 0 1
Tobinq 1.261 0.335 0.947 1.166 4.94
Meet 0.072 0.259 0 0 1
Level 0.495 0.18 0.081 0.508 0.909
Cash 0.053 0.078 0.197 0.053 0.27
Size 21.247 0.934 18.322 21.145 26.978
State 0.593 0.491 0 1 1
Table 1
Deﬁnitions of main variables.
Variable Deﬁnition
Individual The sum of shares held by the top 10 individual tradable shareholders/total number of shares
Fund The sum of shares held by securities investment funds/total number of shares
Director Natural logarithm of the sum of shares held by executives
Nshare Total non-tradable shares/total number of shares
Inde The number of independent directors/the number of members of the board of directors
Ceo Dummy that equals 1 if the chairman and general manager is the same person and 0 otherwise
Tobinq (the number of tradable shares  this year closing price + non-tradable shares  net assets per share book
value + debt)/total book value
Meet Dummy that equals 1 if the rate of return on net assets (ROE) is between 6% and 7%, and 0 otherwise
Level Total liabilities/total assets
Cash Net cash ﬂow from operating activities/total assets
Size Natural logarithm of total assets
State Dummy that equals 1 if the controlling shareholder is the state and 0 otherwise
Industry According to the CSRC industry standard, manufacturing industry classiﬁcation at the second level and
removing the ﬁnancial industry, we deﬁne 21 dummy variables and the benchmark is M, comprehensive
industry
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the tax cut on a company’s dividend policy.
The explanatory variables of primary interest are Individual, which is measured by the
percentage of shares held by the top 10 tradable individual shareholders; Fund, which is
measured by the percentage of shares held by investment funds; and Director, which is
measured by the percentage of shares held by executives.
The control variables include the proﬁtability of a company, company size, debt ratio
and ﬁrm growth, which have important inﬂuences on dividend policies (Allen and Micha-
ely, 2003; Baker et al., 2001; Leithner and Zimmermann, 1993; Kato and Loewensteinm,
1995; Li et al., 2006). In addition, we also include measures of corporate governance,
the nature of the enterprise, and the chairman and general manager being the same per-
son, which are likely to affect companies’ dividend policies (Yuan and Su, 2004). The def-
initions of the main variables are presented in Table 1.
Table 3
Correlation coefﬁcients.
Increase Tax Individual Fund Director Nshare Inde Ceo Tobinq Meet Level Cash
Increase 1
Tax 0.041*** 1
Individual 0.188*** 0.187*** 1
Fund 0.217*** 0.151*** 0.320* 1
Director 0.027* 0.012 0.01 0.059*** 1
Nshare 0.071*** 0.218*** 0.200*** 0.115*** 0.218*** 1
Inde 0.027* 0.147*** 0.053*** 0.029** 0.027* 0.059*** 1
Ceo 0.032** 0.011 0.041*** 0.015 0.021 0.016 0.038*** 1
Tobinq 0.073*** 0.023 0.036** 0.290*** 0.019 0.098*** 0.013 0.022 1
Meet 0.028* 0.047*** 0.002 0.056*** 0.005 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.032** 1
Level 0.143*** 0.083*** 0.090*** 0.051*** 0.011 0.087*** 0.058*** 0.011 0.155*** 0.052*** 1
Cash 0.203*** 0.059*** 0.151*** 0.237*** 0.025* 0.021 0.001 0.014 0.100*** 0.013 0.166*** 1
State 0.043*** 0.099*** 0.151*** 0.017 0.076*** 0.115*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.030* 0.049*** 0.038**
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 4
Individual shareholders.
Variables (1) (2)
Increase Increase
Tax 0.419*** (0.001) 0.444*** (0.000)
Individual 108.643*** (0.000) 75.779*** (0.000)
Tax  individual 53.998*** (0.001) 48.674*** (0.001)
Nshare 0.842** (0.021)
Inde 1.303 (0.130)
Ceo 0.146 (0.332)
Tobinq 0.635*** (0.000)
Meet 0.356** (0.017)
Level 1.706*** (0.000)
Cash 4.658*** (0.000)
Size 0.266*** (0.000)
State 0.009 (0.925)
Constant 1.633*** (0.000) 7.799*** (0.000)
Industry Included Included
Observations 4592 4313
Log likelihood 1935 1723
Pseudo R2 0.0803 0.128
p-Values calculated according to the robust standard error by Petersen (2008) are reported in parentheses.
 p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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The sample comprises 4605 listed companies with A-shares in China’s stock market
between 13 June, 2003 and 13 June, 2007 to test the effects of the dividend tax cut.4
The selected companies must have been listed since 2003, which ensures 2 years before
the dividend tax cut for paired comparison. In addition, we remove ST and PT companies,
ﬁnancial institutions and companies with missing variables. All ﬁnancial indicators and equi-
ty structure data is obtained from the CSMAR database. Data on the securities investment
fund shares and proﬁts distributed accumulatively in cash or stocks in the last 3 years are
from the Wind database, and dividend data is from the China Center for Economic Research
(CCER) database.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics. We winsorized the top and bottom 1% of obser-
vations for all the continuous variables to reduce the impact of extreme observations. In
Table 2, we ﬁnd that 17.1% of companies increased their dividend payments and the pro-
portion of shares held by the top 10 individual tradable shareholders is, on average, about
1%. The mean value of director is 6.187, the mean value of fund is 2.3% and the mean value
of Nshare is 57%. The proportion of independent directors is, on average, about 34%. These
results are consistent with the basic characteristics of A-share listed companies in China,
indicating that sample selection bias is not a major concern.4 Because the 2006 dividends may have been allocated in 2007 and some companies also paid dividends in mid-2007, we use
the date of the announcement of dividends to identify the speciﬁc dividend year.
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shares held by individual shareholders (individual) and the likelihood of an increase in div-
idend payments (increase) are highly negatively correlated (0.188), which suggests thatTable 5
Investment funds.
Variables (1) (2)
Increase Increase
Tax 0.296*** (0.001) 0.170* (0.081)
Fund 11.454*** (0.000) 9.554*** (0.000)
Tax  fund 3.956** (0.012) 4.350*** (0.007)
Nshare 1.562*** (0.000)
Inde 1.285 (0.147)
Ceo 0.168 (0.284)
Tobinq 0.375*** (0.007)
Meet 0.422*** (0.004)
Level 1.965*** (0.000)
Cash 4.156*** (0.000)
Size 0.353*** (0.000)
State 0.043 (0.660)
Constant 2.634*** (0.000) 10.272*** (0.000)
Industry Included Included
Observations 4591 4313
Log likelihood 1944 1714
Pseudo R2 0.0758 0.133
p-Values calculated according to the robust standard error by Petersen (2008) are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 6
Managerial ownership.
Variables (1) (2)
Increase Increase
Tax 0.379*** (0.001) 0.359*** (0.004)
Director 0.006 (0.612) 0.002 (0.858)
Tax  director 0.024* (0.068) 0.025* (0.079)
Nshare 1.415*** (0.000)
Inde 1.131 (0.173)
Ceo 0.165 (0.266)
Tobinq 0.735*** (0.000)
Meet 0.343** (0.021)
Level 1.941*** (0.000)
Cash 4.941*** (0.000)
Size 0.451*** (0.000)
State 0.067 (0.495)
Constant 2.555*** (0.000) 12.778*** (0.000)
Industry Included Included
Observations 4591 4313
Log likelihood 2024 1747
Pseudo R2 0.0378 0.117
p-Values calculated according to the robust standard error by Petersen (2008) are reported in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.1.
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addition, higher proportions of shares held by executives are positively related to in-
creased dividend payments and companies with higher proportions of investment fund
shares are positively related to increased dividend payments, indicating that both have
an important effect on companies’ dividend policies.
5. Empirical results
Tables 4–6 present the empirical results of Models (1)–(3), respectively.
Table 4 presents the results of Model (1). In columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, we ﬁnd that
the proportion of shares held by individual shareholders (individual) has a negative and
signiﬁcant relationship with increased dividend payments, 108.643 (p = 0.000) and
75.779 (p = 0.000), which indicates that there is an apparent conﬂict of interest between
large shareholders and small shareholders. However, the coefﬁcients of the interaction be-
tween the tax cut and individual shareholders in Table 4 columns (1) and (2), tax  individ-
ual, are positive and signiﬁcant, 53.998 (p = 0.001) and 48.674 (p = 0.001), thus indicating
that following the dividend tax cut, the companies with higher proportions of shares held
by individual shareholders were more likely to increase their dividend payments. Deng
et al. (2007) argue that dividend payments represent the shared interests of large and
small shareholders; therefore the dividend tax cut has alleviated the conﬂict of interest be-
tween the two classes of shareholders to some extent.
Table 5 presents the results of Model (2). Cash dividends are an important revenue
source for securities investment funds. Especially during times of market downturn, secu-
rities investment funds prefer to invest in listed companies that offer cash dividends. We
ﬁnd the coefﬁcients of Fund in Table 5 columns (1) and (2) are positive and signiﬁcant,
11.454 (p = 0.000) and 9.554 (p = 0.000), which suggest that companies with higher pro-
portions of shares held by investment funds are more likely to increase their dividend pay-
ments. Moreover, after the dividend tax cut, this increasing tendency is more obvious.
Without including the other control variables, the coefﬁcient of Tax  Fund in Table 5 col-
umn (1) is positive and signiﬁcant; while with all the control variables, the coefﬁcient of
Tax  Fund in Table 5 column (2) is also positive and signiﬁcant.
Table 6 presents the results of Model (3). The coefﬁcients of the interaction between the
tax cut and shares held by executives in Table 6 columns (1) and (2), Tax  Director, are po-
sitive and signiﬁcant, 0.024 and 0.025, thus indicating the existence of opportunistic
behavior arising from executives’ self-interested motivation to increase dividend
payments.
6. Robustness tests
A number of robustness checks were undertaken. First, the observation window was
modiﬁed to (2, 3) years, i.e. between 13 June, 2003 and 13 June, 2008,5 but this does
not alter the main conclusions.
Second, we ignore the effects of the regulations, ‘Administration of Offerings of
New Shares by Listed Companies Procedures’ and ‘Proﬁts distributed accumulatively
in the latest 3 years in cash or stocks shall be no less than 20% of annual distribu-5 Because some indicators in the CSMAR database are obtained after 2003, the window of the robustness test is only (2, 3).
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not change.
Third, during the sample period the shares held by funds increase year by year. There-
fore, even without the dividend tax cut, companies with higher proportions of shares held
by funds are also likely to have increased their dividend payments. We also consider this
fact in a robustness test. As the number of shares held by funds changes little between
2004 and 2005, we use the 2004 and 2005 samples to re-estimate the results and ﬁnd that
all conclusions are still robust.
7. Conclusion
Dividend taxation is an important component of the taxes of individual investors and
has attracted the attention of policymakers and ﬁnancial economists. Recently, numerous
countries have focused on capital market taxation reforms. However, what is confusing is
that the dividend tax reforms in different countries have been in completely different
directions. Some countries, such as Britain and Germany, have increased their dividend
tax rates, while other countries, such as the United States, have decreased their dividend
tax rates. Moreover, there are also different theoretical arguments concerning dividend
taxes. The ‘traditional view’ argues that reduced dividend tax rates increase companies’
dividend payments, while the ‘new theory’ states the contrary.
This paper investigates a causal relationship between the 2005 dividend tax cut in China
and increased dividend payments, in order to evaluate China’s dividend taxation reforms.
We use the natural experiment and difference-in-difference estimator methods to esti-
mate the impact of the dividend tax cut on companies’ dividend policies. We ﬁnd that
the 2005 dividend tax cut led ﬁrms to increase their dividend payments. Companies with
higher proportions of tradable individual shares or investment fund shares were more
likely to increase their dividend payouts. However, opportunistic behavior is also found
to occur, where companies with higher proportions of shares held by executives were
more likely to increase their dividend payments. These ﬁndings support a causal relation-
ship between the tax cut and increased dividend payments and imply that the reform of
dividend taxation in 2005 achieved its goal. However, due to this study’s short observation
window, the long-term effects of the dividend tax cut still require further study.
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